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Abstract
This note is devoted to the question: How restrictive is the assump-
tion that preferences be Euclidean in d dimensions. In particular it is
proven that a preference proﬁle with I individuals and A alternatives
can be represented by Euclidean utilities with d dimensions if and only
if d ≥ min(I,A−1). The paper also describes the systems of A points
which allow for the representation of any proﬁle over A alternatives,
and provides some results when only strict preferences are considered.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
A popular model in Political Science is the “spatial model of preferences”.
It amounts to consider that the alternatives which are the objects of prefer-
ences are points in the Euclidean d-dimensional space I Rd, that an individual
is characterized by his or her “ideal point” in that same space, and that al-
ternatives are judged as good as they are close to the ideal point.
One-dimension Euclidean preference proﬁles are very speciﬁc, they show
no Condorcet cycles (Hotelling, 1929, Arrow, 1952, Black, 1958). But this
property is lost as soon as d is at least 2, and the chaotic behavior of ma-
jority rule can be seen in the planar Euclidean model (Davis, de Groot and
Hinish, 1972). Multi-dimensional models are often used as an illustration
of the theory (Stokes, 1963 [16], Enelow and Hinish, 1990), applications to
Public Economics and the theory of taxation are possible (for instance Gev-
ers and Jacquemin, 1987, and De Donder, 2000) but not so common because
of intrinsic limitations of the Euclidean model (Milyo 2000). Empirical use
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1of the spatial model in Politics are numerous, an important problem be-
ing to develop adequate statistical tools for estimation of ideal points (see
Londregan, 2000 [12], Bailey, 2001 [2], Poole, 2005 [14]).
This note is devoted to the following question: how restrictive is the
assumption that a ﬁnite preference proﬁle be Euclidean in d dimensions?
We are not aware of any closely related studies. In Graph theory, Johnson
and Slater, 1988 [11], and Gu, Reid and Schnyder, 1995 [9]1, considered the
realization of asymmetric digraphs (also called “weak tournaments”) as the
majority relation associated to some preference proﬁle, when preferences
are supposed to be derived from distances on a graph. Working in a sin-
gle dimension, Brams, Jones and Kilgour, 2002 [4] introduced a distinction
between ordinally and cardinally single-peaked preferences. Euclidean pref-
erences (in one dimension) are a particular type of cardinally single-peaked
preferences.
We restrict our attention to the ﬁnite setting and use the following vo-
cabulary. There is a ﬁnite number I of individuals i ∈ {1,...,I} and a ﬁnite
number A of alternatives a ∈ {1,...,A}.Apreference Ri for individual i is a
weak order on {1,...,A}; for alternatives a and b, aRib means that i prefers
a to b, that is strictly prefers (denoted aPib) or is indiﬀerent between a and b
(denoted a ∼i b). A preference is strict if a ∼i b implies a = b. A preference
proﬁle is a vector R =( Ri)
I
i=1.L e t RA,I be the set of preference proﬁles
with I individuals and A alternatives. Let k·k denote the usual 2-norm and
xa · vi denote the usual scalar product in I Rd.
Deﬁnition 1 Ap r o ﬁle R ∈ RA,I is Euclidean of dimension d if there exist
points xa, a =1 ,...,Ain I Rd such that, for all a and b and for all individuals
i, either there exists a point ωi ∈ I Rd such that:
aRib ⇐⇒
° °xa − ωi° ° ≤
° ° °xb − ωi
° ° °,
or there exists a direction vi ∈ I Rd such that:
aRib ⇐⇒ xa · vi ≥ xb · vi.
If any proﬁle in RA,I is Euclidean of dimension d then we say that d is
suﬃcient for I orders on A alternatives.
Point xa is called the location of alternative a,p o i n tωi is called the ideal
point of individual i and vi the ideal direction for individual i. Indiﬀerence
1Thanks to Michel Le Breton for indicating this reference to us.
2curves are spheres in the ﬁr s tc a s ea n dh y p e r p l a n e s( o rt h ew h o l es p a c e )i n
the second case. We refer to the ﬁrst type of preferences as “quadratic”,
or “spheric”We could refer to the second type as “linear”, but the term
“linear preference” is usually used with another meaning, therefore we use
the expression “directional” preference (Rabinowitz and MacDonald, 1989
[15]. The case of complete indiﬀerence corresponds to the degenerated ideal
direction vi =0 . Non degenerated directional preferences can be seen as
limit case of quadratic preferences, when the ideal point ωi goes to inﬁnity
in the direction vi. Here are some obvious properties:
Proposition 2 Suppose that d is suﬃcient for I orders on A alternatives,
then:
(i) d is suﬃcient on A alternatives for all I0 ≤ I.
(ii) d is suﬃcient for I orders for all A0 ≤ A.
(iii) d0 is suﬃcient for I orders on A alternatives for all d0 ≥ d.
The following results will be proved. In section 2.1 we determine when
dimension d is suﬃcient; theorem 6 states that d is suﬃcient for I orders
on A alternatives if and only if d ≥ min{I,A− 1}. In section 2.2 we char-
acterize the systems of locations which are able to represent all preferences;
theorem 9 states that a system of A points in I Rd allows for the Euclidean
representation of any preference proﬁle over A alternatives if and only if it
spans a space of dimension A − 1.
Notice that we allow for indiﬀerences, and that preferences with indif-
ferences are used in some proofs. If one only considers proﬁles of strict pref-
erences, then the smallest necessary number of dimensions is proven to be
between min{I −1,A−1} and min{I,A−1}. Section 2.3 is devoted to the
strict preference case.
2R e s u l t s
2.1 Determination of the suﬃcient dimension
The following result states that any proﬁle is Euclidean provided one con-
siders as many dimensions as there are individuals.
Proposition 3 If d ≥ I, d is suﬃcient for all A.
Proof. It is enough to prove this for d = I.D e ﬁne for each alternative a a
point xa in I RI by saying that its i-th coordinate is:
xa
i = −#{b : aRib}.
3For instance, on axis i, individual i’s best preferred alternative has coor-
dinate −1 and i’s worst alternative has coordinate −A. Then, for some





M if j = i
0 if j 6= i.
Then it is easy to see that, for M large enough the points xa and ωi represent
the proﬁle R in I RI. This proves the result using only spheric preferences.
QED
Proposition 4 If d ≥ A − 1 then d is suﬃcient for all I.
Proof. It is enough to prove this for d = A − 1. Consider the A points xa
in I RA,d e ﬁned by the coordinate of xa on axis b ∈ {1,...A} being xa
b =1
if a = b and xa
b =0if a 6= b. Notice that the points xa all belong to the
linear space ∆A =
n




of dimension A − 1.L e ta and
b be two alternatives The median to the segment [xa,x b] is a hyperplane
H(a ∼ b) which divides ∆A in two half spaces that can be denoted H(a>b )
and H(b>a ), H(a>b ) being the set of points in ∆A which are closer to
a than to b. In an Euclidean representation of her preference, an individual
strictly prefers a to b if and only if her ideal point is in H(a>b ).L e tRi be
a preference over the set {1,...A}, the condition for a point ωi to serve as
an ideal point for Ri is thus that ωi belongs to H(a>b ) for all a 6= b such




H(a>b ) 6= ∅.
By symmetry, if Ω(Ri) is empty for some preference Ri,i ti se m p t yf o ra l l
preferences, and this is obviously not the case. Therefore for any preference
Ri, Ω(Ri) 6= ∅ and it follows that for any proﬁle R =( Ri)
I
i=1 there exist
points ωi, i =1 ,...I that represent R in ∆A with respect to the points xa,
a =1 ,...,A. This proves the result using only spheric preferences.
QED
Proposition 5 Dimension d is not suﬃcient for I = d +1individuals
and A = d +2alternatives.
4Proof. Consider the following proﬁle, with I = d +1individuals and
A = d +2alternatives (to avoid confusion, denote a0,a 1...,ai,...a d+1 the
alternatives): The individual i ∈ {1,...,d+1 } strictly prefers alternative ai
to any other and is indiﬀerent between all the others:
aiPiaj for j 6= i
aj ∼i ak for j,k 6= i
For d =1 ,c o n s i d e r3 locations x0,x 1 and x2 on a line. These three
locations must be diﬀerent one from the other. Thus, for the indiﬀerences
to be possible, preferences cannot be directional. Considering the preference
R1,o n ec a ns e et h a tx1 must be between x0 and x2, and for the preference
R2, x2 must be between x0 and x1, impossible.
For d =2 , the proﬁle is:
i =1 i =2 i =3
a1 a2 a3
a0 ∼ a2 ∼ a3 a0 ∼ a1 ∼ a3 a0 ∼ a1 ∼ a2
The result will then be proven by induction on d, starting from d =2 .
For a contradiction, consider an Euclidean representation of the proﬁle in
I R2,w i t hp o i n t sx0,...,x 3 for the alternatives.
In a ﬁrst part of the proof, suppose that some individual preference,
for instance R3 is directional. Then x0,x 1 and x2 are on a line. For the
preference R1, x1 must be between x0 and x2, and for the preference R2, x2
must be between x0 and x1,i m p o s s i b l e .
In a second part of the proof, suppose that all individual preferences are
spheric. It is easy to see that the 4 locations x0,...,x 3 are distinct. For
i =1 ,t h e3 points x0,x 2,x 3 are on a circle S1 centered at the ideal point
ω1 and the location x1 is inside the disk, and similarly for i =2 ,3. Denote:
Si = {y ∈ I R2 :
° °y − ωi° ° =
° °x0 − ωi° °},
Bi = {y ∈ I R2 :
° °y − ωi° ° <
° °x0 − ωi° °}.
the proﬁle is such that, for all i 6= j :
xj ∈ Si
xi ∈ Bi.
In particular, x0 is on Si for i =1 ,2,3.
5We now prove that this is impossible. Consider the inversion of center
x0 and ratio 1, that is the application ψ form I R2 \{ x0} onto itself deﬁned
by:




As is well-known, this application is involutive (ψ(ψ(x)) = x) and transforms
the spheres that contain x0 into hyperplanes that do not contain x0.
For i =1 ,2,3,d e n o t eyi = ψ(xi). Suppose ﬁrstly that the points yi are
on a single hyperplane (a line) that does not contain x0. Then, by ψ,t h e3
circles Si, i ∈ {1,...,d+1 } are identical, which is impossible.
Suppose secondly that the points yi are on a line that contains x0,t h e n
by ψ,t h ep o i n t sxi are on that same line. Then the three points x0,x 1,x 2
being at the same distance from ω3, two of them at least are equal, which
is impossible.
Suppose now that the 3 points yi span I R2. Then there exists a unique







For i ≥ 1, the center of inversion is on the circle S1 thus its image is a line
that we denote by Di.M o r e o v e r ,i fxi ∈ Bi, its image yi is one the side of
Di opposite to the center x0,t h e r e f o r eλi < 0. Hence it cannot be the case
that xi ∈ Bi for all i.
It remains to complete the induction. Suppose the result is true up to
d − 1 and consider an Euclidean representation of the proﬁle in I Rd,w i t h
locations x0,...,x d+1 for the alternatives.
If one preference, say Rd+1 is directional, then the points x0,...,x d are
on a hyperplane. Dropping individual d+1and alternative d+1yields the
same proﬁle at the previous order, by the induction hypothesis, it cannot
be represented with d − 1 dimensions.
Suppose now that all preferences are spheric. The argument is the same
as for d =2 .T h ed +1spheres Si = {y ∈ I Rd :
° °y − ωi° ° =
° °x0 − ωi° °} are
diﬀerent one from the other and intersect at x0,a n df o ri =1 ,...,d+1, xi is
inside Si. By inversion, points xi are transformed into d+1 points y1,...,yd+1
that cannot be on a single hyperplane otherwise the points x0,x 1,...,x d+1
6would be either on the same hyperplane or on the same sphere, both sit-
uations being impossible. Thus y1,...,yd+1 span I Rd and the conclusion
follows.
QED
Theorem 6 Dimension d is suﬃcient for I orders on A alternatives if and
only if d ≥ min{I,A− 1}
Proof. Propositions 3 and 4 prove that d is suﬃcient if d ≥ min{I,A−1}.
Conversely, take d<Iand d<A− 1,t h e nI ≥ d +1and A ≥ d +2and
we know from Proposition 5 that d is not suﬃcient for I = d+1individuals
on A = d +2alternatives.
QED
2.2 Systems of locations that represent all preferences
Given a number A of alternatives, we identify the systems of points (xa)
A
a=1
which are such that any preference over alternatives 1,...,A can be repre-
sented with these points.
Lemma 7 If (xa)
A
a=1 is a system of A points in I RA−1 that allows for
the Euclidean representation of all preferences then the median hyperplanes
H(a ∼ b),f o ra,b ∈ {1,...,A} have a non-empty intersection
Proof. If two such hyperplanes, say H(a ∼ b) and H(c ∼ d) have empty
intersection, it must be the case that one half space H(a<b ) or H(a>b )
is included in H(c<d ) or H(c>d ). If, for instance, H(a<b ) ⊆ H(c<d )
the system is unable to represent a preference such that aRib and dRic.
Thus two hyperplanes intersect. Suppose, for a contradiction, that we can
only ﬁnds k points, with k<A whose median hyperplanes intersect. For
instance: \
1≤a,b≤k
H(a ∼ b) 6= ∅
but: \
1≤a,b≤k
H(a ∼ b) ⊆ H(1 <k+1 )
this implies that the system is unable to represent preferences such that aIib
for all a,b ≤ k and (k +1 ) Pi1.
7QED
Lemma 8 (i) If (xa)
A
a=1 is a system of A points in I RA−1 that allow for
the Euclidean representation of all preferences on A alternatives, then the
intersection of the median hyperplanes is a singleton.
(ii) If (xa)
A+1
a=1 is a system of A +1points in I Rd that allow for the
Euclidean representation of all preferences on A+1 alternatives then (xa)
A+1
a=1
spans a space of dimension A.
Proof. The lemma will be proved by induction on A.
For A =2point (i) is trivially true. For point (ii), consider three diﬀerent
points. If they are on a line then one is between the other two, then no
preference can rank this point last.
For A ≥ 2 suppose that both (i) and (ii) are true. To check (i) at
the next order, consider A +1points
©
x1,...,x A+1ª
⊆ I RA that allow for
the Euclidean representation of any preference on {1,...,A+1 }.We know
that the intersection of the median hyperplanes is nonempty. If it is not
a singleton then it is some linear space of positive dimension. Let E be
an aﬃne subspace orthogonal to that intersection, the dimension of E is at
most A − 1.L e t b x1,...,b xA+1 be the projections of x1,...,x A+1 on E.I f




let b ωi be the projection of ωi on E. Then it is easy to check that:





° °b xa − b ωi° ° ≤
° °
°b xb − b ωi
° °
°
so that Ri is well represented. We thus have found Euclidean representation
of preferences over A +1alternatives with at most A − 2 dimensions. By
the induction hypothesis (ii), this is impossible. This establish the induction
step for point (i).
To check (ii) at the next order, consider a system (xa)
A+2
a=1 of A+2points
in I Rd that allows for the Euclidean representation of any preference on A+2
alternatives and suppose, for a contradiction, that these points do not span
a space of dimension A +1 , which means that they are included in a linear




\{ xa} of A +1of these points allows for
the euclidean representation of any preference on {1,...,A+2 }\{ a} and
thus, by point (i), there exist a unique point, call it zA+2,e q u i d i s t a n tf r o m
x1,..., xA+1. This point is such that an individual i is indiﬀerent between
alternatives 1,. . . ,A+1i fa n do n l yi fωi = zA+2.I fzA+2 ∈ H(1 <A+2),w e
8ﬁnd that an individual cannot have the preference 1Ii2...Ii(A+1)Pi(A+2),
and zA+2 ∈ H(1 ∼ A +2 )or zA+2 ∈ H(A +2< 1) would entail similar
preference restrictions, in contradiction with the hypothesis. It thus must
be the case that (xa)
A+2
a=1 spans a space of dimension A +1 .
QED
Theorem 9 As y s t e mo fA points (xa)
A
a=1 in I Rd allows for the Euclidean
representation of all preferences over A alternatives if and only if d ≥ A−1
and (xa)
A
a=1 spans a space of dimension A − 1.
Proof. The “only if part” is point (ii) of the previous lemma. The converse
will be proven by induction. For A =2 ,i ti se a s y .T a k eA>2 and suppose
that (xa)
A
a=1 spans a space of dimension A−1,d e n o t ei t[x1,...,x A].C o n s i d e r
ap r e f e r e n c er e l a t i o nRi.
If there exists an alternative (say alternative A) which is strictly preferred
to all the other alternatives. The points (xa)
A−1
a=1 span a space [x1,...,x A−1]
of dimension A − 2 therefore, by the induction hypothesis, there exists a
point ω ∈ [x1,...,x A−1] such that ω with respect to x1,...,x A−1 represents
the restriction of Ri to {1,...,A− 1}.L e t n,w i t hknk =1be a vector in
[x1,...,x A], orthogonal to [x1,...,xA−1],w ec a nc h o o s en such that (xA−ω)·
n>0. Notice that for any λ, ω+λn represents the restriction of Ri as well.
Moreover, for any xa ∈ [x1,...,xA−1]:
kω + λn − xak
2 = λ2 + kω − xak
2
Write xA−ω = xA−yA+yA−ω with yA the projection of xA on [x1,...,x A−1],




° °xA − yA° °¢2
+
° °ω − yA° °2
.
It follows that, for λ large enough, ω +λn is closer to xA than to xa.T h u s ,
for λ large enough, ωi = ω + λn represents Ri.
The reasoning is similar if there are several alternatives which are strictly
preferred to the others and among which the individual is indiﬀerent, say
xk+1 ∼i xk+2 ∼i ... ∼i xA.T a k ee ω ∈ [x1,...,xk] that represents the restric-
tion of Ri to {1,...,k}.A n yω = e ω+y such that y is orthogonal to [x1,...,x k]
represents this restriction as well. Let E be the set of such ω, E is a linear
space of dimension (A − 1) − (k − 1) = A − k.L e tb ω be the center of the
sphere in [xk+1,...,x A] that contains points xk+1,...,x A, b ω represents the re-
striction of Ri to {k+1,...,A},a n da n yω = b ω+z such that z is orthogonal
9to [xk+1,...,x A] represents this restriction as well. Let F be the set of such
ω, F is a linear space of dimension (A−1)−(A−k−1) = k. Since the whole
space has dimension A−1, E ∩F contains a line L, which means that there
exists a point t and a vector n with knk =1 which satisﬁes the following
property: For all λ,t h ep o i n t si nL,w h i c hw ec a nd e n o t eω(λ)=t+λn,a r e
such that ω(λ) − e ω is orthogonal to [x1,...,x k] and ωλ − b ω is orthogonal to
[xk+1,...,x A].A n ys u c hω(λ) represents both restrictions.
Let ω(e λ)=t+e λn be the projection of e ω on L. Because L is orthogonal




λ − e λ
´2
+




Similarly, let ω(b λ)=t+ b λn be the projection of b ω on L,f o rk +1≤ b ≤ A :





λ − b λ
´2
+












b λ − e λ
´
+ constant.
If the ω(e λ)=ω(b λ),t h e nb o t h[x1,...,x k] and [xk+1,...,x A] are included
in the same hyperplane orthogonal to L, contradicting the hypothesis that
[x1,...,x A] is the whole space. Thus b λ 6= λ By taking λ large enough and
with the sign of b λ−e λ ,t h ea b o v ed i ﬀerence will be positive, so that the ideal
point ω(λ) will assure that alternatives b>kare preferred to alternatives
a ≤ k.
Finally, if Ri is the complete indiﬀerence, the center of the sphere that
contains all the points xa can serve as the ideal point.
QED
2.3 Strict preferences
The previous proofs relied on indiﬀerences in preferences. If we restrict our
attention to strict preferences, things are diﬀerent. Consider the case d =1 .
Proposition 5 implies that there exist a proﬁle of (non strict) preferences with
2 individuals and 3 alternatives, which is not Euclidean in 1 dimension. But,
l o o k i n ga ta l lt h ep o s s i b l ec a s e s ,i ti sn o td i ﬃcult to check that any proﬁle
10of strict preferences with 2 individuals and 3 alternatives is Euclidean in 1
dimension.
We know that a proﬁle is Euclidean if d ≥ min{I,A− 1}. For instance
ap r o ﬁle of strict preferences with I =4individuals and A =4alternatives
can always be represented in d =3dimensions, but it is not clear wether
2 dimensions are enough. An example will show that d =2is indeed not
enough for 4 individuals and 4 alternatives. Notice that this leaves open
t h eq u e s t i o n“ I sa n yp r o ﬁle of strict preferences with 3 individuals and 4
alternatives Euclidean of dimension 2?” The question for larger d is also left
open.
Note that if a strict preference order of an agent i can be represented as
a directional preference in some direction vi, then it also can be represented
as a spheric preference in the same direction by choosing the location ωi
for the agent i far enough in the direction vi We thus can exclude direc-
tional preferences, and only check whether it is possible to represent strict
preference proﬁles by spheric preferences.
Proposition 10 For all strict proﬁles to be Euclidean it is necessary that
d ≥ min{I − 1,A− 1}.







It is enough to check that one cannot ﬁnd d locations x1,...,x d for the
alternatives and d locations ω1,...,ωd for the agents in (d − 2)-dimensional
Euclidean space, such that ||xj1 − ωi|| < ||xj2 − ωi|| i fa n do n l yi faj1Piaj2.
Assume to the contrary that such locations can be found. Since prefer-
ences are strict, all points x1,...,x d must be all diﬀerent.
First, note that any d points in (d − 2)-dimensional Euclidean space
are aﬃnely dependent, i.e. there exist real numbers α1,...,αk such that
d P
i=1
αixi = 0 and
d P
i=1
αi =0 . We can rewrite this condition in the following
way. Leave the members with α > 0 on the left side of each of the two
11equations, and put the members with α ≤ 0 on the right side. Then rename
variables, by calling y1,...,yn locations with α > 0,a n dz1,...,zm locations
with α > 0 (m + n = d); also rename positive α-s into β-s, and nonpositive
α-s into (−γ)-s (thus, γ-s are nonnegative). We thus obtain for d points












γj, βi > 0, γj ≥ 0.
Next, an individual with Euclidean preferences, located at point ω,
prefers b located at y to c located at z, i fa n do n l yi f||ω − y||2 < ||ω − z||2,
i.e., if and only if y · y − 2ω · y<z· z − 2ω · z.
Think now about our alternatives as points x1,...,x d,l o c a t e do nt h e
circle (in that precise order clockwise), each also marked as yi or zj,a n d
with an attached weight βi or γj.
Start from some yi1 = xt and go clockwise summing up separately all
weights βi, and separately all weights γj, until ﬁrst sum becomes smaller
then the second. I.e., we start from
P
β = βi1 ≥
P
γ =0 . If next alternative
clockwise on the circle, xt+1,i say-alternative yi1+1,t h e n
P
β = βi1 +
βi1+1 ≥
P
γ =0 , and we continue. If next alternative xt+1 is a z-alternative
zj1,t h e nw ec o n t i n u ei f
P
β = βi1 ≥
P
γ = γj1, and stop if
P
β = βi1 < P





γ = γj1+γj1+1+γj1+2+...,o r ,i fi tn e v e rh a p p e n s ,
we stop when we make the whole circle and return to the alternative yi1 = xt.
Assume that we were forced to stop before we made the whole circle.
Then we attach the sum
P
β = βi1 + βi1+1 + βi1+2 + .. we got so far to
the alternative yi1,c a l lt h eﬁrst y-alternative, clockwise after we stopped,
yi2 (note that we had to stop at some z-alternative), and repeat the same
process, etc.
After no more then n<dsteps, we will be starting from some y-
alternative, from which we already were starting before: assume without loss
of generality that when we write down the y-alternatives we were choosing,
yi1,yi2,yi3,...,the ﬁrst alternative which repeats itself is yi1 (otherwise just
through away ﬁrst several alternatives), i.e. our sequence is
yi1,yi2,yi3,...,yiq−1,yiq,yi1,...
Consider the ﬁrst q alternatives in this sequence (i.e. the longest sequence
without repetition), yi1,yi2,yi3,...,yiq−1,yiq together with attached to them
12sums
P
β . We remember that for each of these alternatives corresponding P
β <
P
γ . Thus the total sum of all their
P
β (we call it
P
ββ) is strictly
smaller then total sum of all corresponding to them
P
γ (we call it
P
γγ).
But in constructing our sequence yi1,yi2,yi3,...,yiq−1,yiq we were moving
clockwise along the circle, and since we stopped just before repeating yi1
we made several (say, Q) whole circles. Our sums
P
β were calculated by
summing up all coeﬃcients β along the way, while our
P
γ were calculated
by summing up coeﬃcients γ along the way (probably skipping some γ-s
















γγ we just proved.
It follows that, starting from at least some alternative yi1, we should be




γ all the way.
Without loss of generality, assume yi1 = y1 = xt.
Consider the agent t for whom the alternative at, located at y1 = xt, is
the best one. Assume that this agent t is located at point ω. We know that
she prefers an alternative b, located at y, to an alternative c, located at z,
i fa n do n l yi fy · y − 2ω · y<z· z − 2ω · z.
Given our proﬁle, we know that preferences of this agent t decrease when
we go along our circle clockwise (starting from y1 = xt) ,a n do nt h ew a y
the sum of weights β at y- a l t e r n a t i v e si sa l w a y sa tl e a s ta sb i ga st h es u m



















γjzj,t h a t
n P
i=1




Now, if we repeat the same circle argument from the beginning, but
for z-alternatives, we obtain that
n P
i=1
βiyi · yi >
m P
j=1
γjzj · zj, the desired
contradiction.
Proposition 10 tells us that for any strict proﬁle to be representable in d
dimensions it has to be true that d ≥ min{I −1,A−1}, while Propositions
4 and 3 tell that it is enough to have d ≥ min{I,A− 1}.T h u s , w e k n o w
the minimal necessary number of dimensions needed to represent all strict
proﬁles, for all cases with min{I − 1,A− 1} =m i n {I,A− 1}.
13Assume that min{I−1,A−1} 6=m i n {I,A−1}. Then min{I−1,A−1} =
I − 1=m i n {I,A − 1} − 1 <A− 1, so this is the case of I agents and
A ≥ I +1alternatives. For this case, our results give that the smallest
necessary number of dimensions d is such that I − 1 ≤ d ≤ I.
The next proposition tells us that, for any I, for A large enough it is
necessary to use I dimensions.
Proposition 11 1) There exists a strict proﬁle with I agents and A =2 I
alternatives, such that it cannot be represented with I − 1 dimensions.
2) All strict proﬁles with I agents and A = I +1alternatives can be
represented with I − 1 dimensions.
Proof. 1) Consider a following strict proﬁle with I agents and A =2 I
alternatives aS,S⊂ {1,...,I}. Let, for any agent i ∈ I, all aS such that
i ∈ S be above a∅, while all aS such that i/ ∈ S be below a∅.F o r s u c h a
proﬁle, for any subset S ⊂ {1,...,I},S6= ∅, there is exactly one alternative
aS 6= a∅, such that all agents from S prefer aS to a∅, while all agents from
{1,...,I}\S prefer a∅ to aS.
We check that any such proﬁle cannot be represented as Euclidean in
I − 1 dimensions.
Assume to the contrary that there is such a representation, and consider
the inversion with the center at a = a∅ and ratio 1. Each sphere with
the center at the location of an agent, containing a = a∅, transforms in a
hyperplane. There are I such hyperplanes, and they divide the (I − 1)-
dimensional Euclidean space in at most 2I − 1 diﬀerent areas.
Consider now the images under this inversion of the following 2I points:
locations of 2I − 1 alternatives, namely all except the alternative a = a∅,
and some point b which is further then a = a∅ from any agent. All these 2I
images must be in diﬀerent areas, since for any two of our points there is
at least one agent for whom one of these points is closer then a = a∅, while
another one is further then a = a∅. This is the desired contradiction.
2) Fix a strict proﬁle with I agents and A = I +1alternatives. There is
at least one alternative, say a, such that it is not the last in the preferences of
any agent. Locate all remaining I alternatives in the vertices of the simplex
in I RI−1, and locate alternative a in the center of this simplex. It is easy
to see that any strict preference order which does not have a as its last
alternative can be represented by locating an agent with such order at some
point in this (I − 1)-dimensional space.
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